2 Although verbally this formula is only slightly different from that of the com-mand, Do good and avoid evil, I shall try to show that the two formulae differ considerably in meaning and that they belong in different theoretical contexts. Philosophers have constructed their systems of ethics weighted in favor of one or another good precisely for this reason. His position has undergone some development in its various presentations. [79] Only one among the natural inclinations of man is that based on his rational nature to act according to rational direction. The latter ability is evidenced in the first principle of practical reason, and it is the same ability which grounds the ability to choose. c. Those who misunderstand Aquinass theory often seem to assume, as if it were obvious, that law is a transient action of an efficient cause physically moving passive objects; for Aquinas, law always belongs to reason, is never considered an efficient cause, and cannot possibly terminate in motion. 4)But just as being is the first thing to fall within the unrestricted grasp of the mind, so good is the first thing to fall within the grasp of practical reasonthat is, reason directed to a workfor every active principle acts on account of an end, and end includes the intelligibility of good. The objective dimension of the reality of beings that we know in knowing this principle is simply the definiteness that is involved in their very objectivity, a definiteness that makes a demand on the intellect knowing them, the very least demandto think consistently of them.[16]. Opposition between the direction of reason and the response of will can arise only subsequent to the orientation toward end expressed in the first principle. Neuf leons sur les notions premires de la philosophie morale (Paris, 1951), 158160. [75] S.T. But over and above this objection, he insists that normative discourse, insofar as it is practical, simply cannot be derived from a mere consideration of facts. Human reason as basis of the goodness and badness of things is faulty, since humans are not perfect. [72] I have tried above to explain how Aquinas understands tendency toward good and orientation toward end as a dimension of all action. Ibid. Like other inclinations, this one is represented by a specific self-evident precept of the natural law, a kind of methodological norm of human action. He points out, to begin with, that the first principle of practical reason must be based on the intelligibility of good, by analogy with the primary theoretical principle which is based on the intelligibility of being. Do good, together with Such an action is good, leads deductively to Do that action. If the first principle actually did function in this manner, all other precepts would be conclusions derived from it. Odon Lottin, O.S.B., Le droit naturel chez Saint Thomas dAquin et ses prdcesseurs (2nd ed., Bruges, 1931), 79 mentions that the issue of the second article had been posed by Albert the Great (cf. Moreover, the fact that the precepts of natural law are viewed as self-evident principles of practical reason excludes Maritains account of our knowledge of them. 57, aa. An intelligibility is all that would be included in the meaning of a word that is used correctly if the things referred to in that use were fully known in all ways relevant to the aspect then signified by the word in question. We may imagine an intelligibility as an intellect-sized bite of reality, a bite not necessarily completely digested by the mind. All of them tended to show that natural law has but one precept. Therefore this is the primary precept of law: Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. Now what is practical reason? We are truly sorry and we humbly repent. In this section I wish to show both that the first principle does not have primarily imperative force and that it is really prescriptive. Nature is not natural law; nature is the given from which man develops and from which arise tendencies of ranks corresponding to its distinct strata. 94, a. Aquinas mentions this point in at least two places. [2] Bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum. Summa theologiae (Leonine ed., Rome, 18821948), 1-2, q. 2, ad 2. In this section I wish to clarify this point, and the lack of prosequendum in the non-Thomistic formula is directly relevant. [65] Moreover, Aquinas simply does not understand the eternal law itself as if it were an imposition of the divine will upon creation;[66] and even if he did understand it in this way, no such imposition would count for human judgment except in virtue of a practical principle to the effect that the divine will deserves to be followed. Thus, the predicate belongs to the intelligibility of the subject does not mean that one element of a complex meaning is to be found among others within the complex. To begin with, Aquinas specifically denies that the ultimate end of man could consist in morally good action. Rather, the works are means to ulterior ends: reason grasps the objects of the natural inclinations as goods and so as things-to-be-pursued by work. The important point to grasp from all this is that when Aquinas speaks of self-evident principles of natural law, he does not mean tautologies derived by mere conceptual analysisfor example: Stealing is wrong, where stealing means the unjust taking of anothers property. But it is central throughout the whole treatise. [21] D. ODonoghue, The Thomist Conception of Natural Law, Irish Theological Quarterly 22, no. Of course, one cannot form these principles if he has no grasp upon what is involved in them, and such understanding presupposes experience. John Locke argued that human beings in the state of nature are free and equal, yet insecure in their freedom. at 1718; cf. Aquinas holds that reason can derive more definite prescriptions from the basic general precepts. objects of knowledge, unknown but waiting in hiding, fully formed and ready for discovery. at q. supra note 8, at 202203: The intellect manifests this truth formally, and commands it as true, for its own goodness is seen to consist in a conformity to the natural object and inclination of the will.). 1, lect. 4, d. 33, q. supra note 21) tries to clarify this point, and does in fact help considerably toward the removal of misinterpretations. It would be easy to miss the significance of the nonderivability of the many basic precepts by denying altogether the place of deduction in the development of natural law. Now since any object of practical reason first must be understood as an object of tendency, practical reasons first step in effecting conformity with itself is to direct the doing of works in pursuit of an end. He judged rule by the few rich (oligarchy) and the many poor (democracy) as "bad" governments. Of course, Aquinas holds that Gods will is prior to the natural law, since the natural law is an aspect of human existence and man is a free creation of God. The basic principle is not related to the others as a premise, an efficient cause, but as a form which differentiates itself in its application to the different matters directed by practical reason. Hence the primary indemonstrable principle is: But just as being is the first thing to fall within the unrestricted grasp of the mind, so good is the first thing to fall within the grasp of practical reasonthat is, reason directed to a workfor every active principle acts on account of an end, and end includes the intelligibility of good. Aquinas expresses the objective aspect of self-evidence by saying that the predicate of a self-evident principle belongs to the intelligibility of the subject, and he expresses the subjective aspect of self-evidence in the requirement that this intelligibility not be unknown. The act which preserves life is not the life preserved; in fact, they are so distinct that it is possible for the act that preserves life to be morally bad while the life preserved remains a human good. Such rights are 'subject to or limited to each other and by other aspects of the common good' - these 'aspects'can be linked to issues concerning public morality, public health or public order. cit. Some interpreters mistakenly ask whether the word good in the first principle has a transcendental or an ethical sense. No, Aquinas considers practical reason to be the mind playing a certain role, or functioning in a certain capacity, the capacity in which it is directed to a work. Direction to work is intrinsic to the mind in this capacity; direction qualifies the very functioning of the mind. Aquinass understanding of the first principle of practical reason avoids the dilemma of these contrary positions. But no such threat, whether coming from God or society or nature, is prescriptive unless one applies to it the precept that horrible consequences should be avoided. As to the end, Suarez completely separates the notion of it from the notion of law. The pursuit of the good which is the end is primary; the doing of the good which is the means is subordinate. The mistaken interpretation of Aquinass theory suggests that law is essentially a curb upon action. Only free acceptance makes the precept fully operative. But must every end involve good? It is difficult to think about principles. An intelligibility includes the meaning and potential meaning of a word uttered by intelligence about a world whose reality, although naturally suited to our minds, is not in itself cut into piecesintelligibilities. For this reason, too, the natural inclinations are not emphasized by Suarez as they are by Aquinas. It also is a mistake to suppose that the primary principle is equivalent to the precept. In accordance with this inclination, those things by which human life is preserved and by which threats to life are met fall under natural law. 2, ad 2. This principle is based on the intelligibility of being (and nonbeing), and all other principles are based on this one, as Aristotle says in the Metaphysics.[7]. Even excellent recent interpreters of Aquinas tend to compensate for the speculative character they attribute to the first principle of practical reason by introducing an act of our will as a factor in our assent to it. 3, ad 2; q. supra note 3, at 6873. We easily form the mistaken generalization that all explicit judgments actually formed by us must meet such conditions. There are people in the world who seek what is good, and there are people in the world who seek what is evil. Is to be is the copula of the first practical principle, not its predicate; the gerundive is the mode rather than the matter of law. The mistaken interpretation of Aquinass theory of natural law considers natural law precepts to be a set of imperatives. He thinks that this is the guiding principle for all our decision making. Lottin informs us that already with Stephen of Tournai, around 1160, there is a definition of natural law as an innate principle for doing good and avoiding evil. from which experience is considered. Just as the principle of contradiction expresses the definiteness which is the first condition of the objectivity of things and the consistency which is the first condition of theoretical reasons conformity to reality, so the first principle of practical reason expresses the imposition of tendency, which is the first condition of reasons objectification of itself, and directedness or intentionality, which is the first condition for conformity to mind on the part of works and ends. 1, q. He concludes his argument by maintaining that the factor which differentiates practical discourse is the presence of decision within it. 1, lect. [77] Sertillanges, op. Obligation is a strictly derivative concept, with its origin in ends and the requirements set by ends. But if the Pies super fan steps . Practical reason has its truth by anticipating the point at which something that is possible through human action will come into conformity with reason, and by directing effort toward that point. [14] A useful guide to Aquinass theory of principles is Peter Hoenen, S.J., Reality and Judgment according to St. Thomas (Chicago, 1952). The intellect is not theoretical by nature and practical only by education. The failure to keep this distinction in mind can lead to chaos in normative ethics. Natural Law, Natural Rights, and American Constitutionalism. In practical knowledge, on the other hand, the knower arrives at the destination first; and what is known will be altered as a result of having been thought about, since the known must conform to the mind of the knower. Some interpreters mistakenly ask whether the word good in the first principle has a transcendental or an ethical sense. In accordance with this inclination, those things are said to be of natural law which nature teaches all animals, among which are the union of male and female, the raising of children, and the like. But his alternative is not the deontologism that assigns to moral value and the perfection of intention the status of absolutes. mentions that the issue of the second article had been posed by Albert the Great (cf. Avoid it, do not pass by it; Turn away from it and pass on. 1 Timothy 6:20. This principle enables the good that is an end not only to illuminate but also to enrich with value the action by which it is attained. Maritain points out that Aquinas uses the word quasi in referring to the prescriptive conclusions derived from common practical principles. Verse Concepts. Sertillanges also tries to understand the principle as if it were a theoretical truth equivalent to an identity statement. C. Pera, P. Mure, P. Garamello (Turin, 1961), 3: ch. humans are under an obligation "to avoid ignorance" (and to seek to know God) and to avoid offending those among whom one has to live. "The good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided" is not very helpful for making actual choices. Usually we do not need to think principles by themselves; we call them to mind only to put them to work. 101 (1955) (also, p. 107, n. 3), holds that Aquinas means that Good is what all things tend toward is the first principle of practical reason, and so Fr. It is important, however, to see the precise manner in which the principle. See also Van Overbeke, loc. It is necessary for the active principle to be oriented toward that something or other, whatever it is, if it is going to be brought about. Therefore, Aquinas believes we need to perfect our reason by the virtues, especially prudence, to discover precepts of the natural law that are more proximate to the choices that one has to make on a day-to-day basis. The theoretical mind crosses the bridge of the given to raid the realm of being; there the mind can grasp everything, actual or possible, whose reality is not conditioned upon the thought and action of man. Reproduced with permission of The American Journal of Jurisprudence (formerly Natural Law Forum). Thus the modern reader is likely to wonder: Are Aquinass self-evident principles analytic or synthetic? Of course, there is no answer to this question in Aquinass terms. [34] Summa contra gentiles 3: chs. Instead of undertaking a general review of Aquinass entire natural law theory, I shall focus on the first principle of practical reason, which also is the first precept of natural law. [57] In libros ethicorum ad Nichomachum, lib. But these references should not be given too much weight, since they refer to the article previously cited in which the distinction is made explicitly. The two fullest commentaries on this article that I have found are J. Good things don't just happen automatically; they are created because the people of God diligently seek what is good. There his formulation of the principle is specifically moralistic: The upright is to be done and the wrong avoided. The aunt of Zara Aleena whose killer refused to leave his cell to attend his sentencing hearing and avoid facing his victim's family said they wanted him to know he 'completely destroyed' them. This would the case for all humans. The results are often . For Aquinas, however, natural law includes counsels as well as precepts. The prescription expressed in gerundive form, on the contrary, merely offers rational direction without promoting the execution of the work to which reason directs. [12] That Aquinas did not have this in mind appears at the beginning of the third paragraph, where he begins to determine the priorities among those things which fall within the grasp of everyone. No doubt there are some precepts not everyone knows although they are objectively self-evidentfor instance, precepts concerning the relation of man to God: God should be loved above all, and: God should be obeyed before all. Remittances to Nicaraguans sent home last year surged 50%, a massive jump that analysts say is directly related to the thousands of Nicaraguans who emigrated to the U.S. in the past two years. The basic precepts of natural law are no less part of the minds original equipment than are the evident principles of theoretical knowledge. Aquinas knew this, and his theory of natural law takes it for granted. Although Bourke is right in noticing that Nielsens difficulties partly arise from his positivism, I think Bourke is mistaken in supposing that a more adequate metaphysics could bridge the gap between theory and practice. The mind uses the power of the knower to see that the known will conform to it; the mind calls the turn. S.T. 44 votes, 141 comments. Without such a foundation God might compel behavior but he could never direct human action. Rather, Aquinas proceeds on the supposition that meanings derive from things known and that experienced things themselves contain a certain degree of intelligible necessity. In sum, the mistaken interpretation of Aquinass theory of natural law supposes that the word good in the primary precept refers solely to moral good. Precisely because the first principle does not specify the direction of human action, it is not a premise in practical reasoning; other principles are required to determine direction. Only free acceptance makes the precept fully operative. cit. The second argument reaches the same conclusion by reasoning that since natural law is based upon human nature, it could have many precepts only if the many parts of human nature were represented in it; but in this case even the demands of mans lower nature would have to be reflected in natural law. Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. 3. 67; Super Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, bk. According to St. Thomas, the very first principle of practical reasoning in general is: The good is to be done and pursued; the bad is to be avoided (S.t., 1-2, q. But there and in a later passage, where he actually mentions pursuit, he seems to be repeating received formulae. Good in the first principle, since it refers primarily to the end, includes within its scope not only what is absolutely necessary but also what is helpful, and the opposed evil includes more than the perfect contrary of the good. (Ditchling, 1930), 103155. [15] On ratio see Andre Haven, S.J., LIntentionnel selon Saint Thomas (2nd ed., Bruges, Bruxelles, Paris, 1954), 175194. [18], Now if practical reason is the mind functioning as a principle of action, it is subject to all the conditions necessary for every active principle. In his response he does not exclude virtuous acts which are beyond the call of duty. So far as I have been able to discover, Aquinas was the first to formulate the primary precept of natural law as he did. In that case we simply observe that we have certain tendencies that are more or less satisfied by what we do. We can know what is good by investigating our natural (rational) inclinations. Hence he holds that some species of acts are bad in themselves, so that they cannot become good under any circumstances.[42]. If practical reason ignored what is given in experience, it would have no power to direct, for what-is-to-be cannot come from nothing. Naus, op. [12] Nielsen, op. He points out that from God wills x, one cannot derive x is obligatory, without assuming the non-factual statement: What God wills is obligatory. He proceeds to criticize what he takes to be a confusion in Thomism between fact and value, a merging of disparate categories which Nielsen considers unintelligible. 78, a. However, to deny the one status is not to suppose the other, for premises and a priori forms do not exhaust the modes of principles of rational knowledge. [30] Ibid. After giving this response to the issue, Aquinas answers briefly each of the three introductory arguments. Desires are to be fulfilled, and pain is to be avoided. After the response Aquinas comments briefly on each of the first three arguments in the light of his resolution of the issue. [2] Although verbally this formula is only slightly different from that of the command, Do good and avoid evil, I shall try to show that the two formulae differ considerably in meaning and that they belong in different theoretical contexts. 2, d. 39, q. This is a directive for action . 2, ad 2. The precepts of reason which clothe the objects of inclinations in the intelligibility of ends-to-be-pursued-by-workthese precepts, There is one obvious difference between the two formulae, Do good and avoid evil, and Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. That difference is the omission of. [56], The good which is the subject matter of practical reason is an objective possibility, and it could be contemplated. The failure to keep this distinction in mind can lead to chaos in normative ethics. Hence part of an intelligibility may escape us without our missing all of it The child who knows that rust is on metal has grasped one self-evident truth about rust, for metal does belong to the intelligibility of rust. Thus, the predicate belongs to the intelligibility of the subject does not mean that one element of a complex meaning is to be found among others within the complex. His response is that law, as a rule and measure of human acts, belongs to their principle, reason. 94, a. To begin with, Aquinas specifically denies that the ultimate end of man could consist in morally good action. Nevertheless, the first principle of practical reason hardly can be understood in the first instance as an imperative. Nor is any operation of our own will presupposed by the first principles of practical reason. Aquinas thinks in terms of the end, and obligation is merely one result of the influence of an intelligible end on reasonable action. The leverage reason gets on these possibilities is expressed in the basic substantive principles of natural law. Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided. They are not derived from prior principles. Of course, Aquinas holds that Gods will is prior to the natural law, since the natural law is an aspect of human existence and man is a free creation of God. The Root of Freedom in St. Thomass Later Works,. The good which is the object of pursuit can be the principle of the rational aspects of defective and inadequate efforts, but the good which characterizes morally right acts completely excludes wrong ones. It is easy to imagine that to know is to picture an object in ones mind, but this conception of knowledge is false. Suitability of action is not to a static nature, but to the ends toward which nature inclines. But binding is characteristic of law; therefore, law pertains to reason. There are two ways of misunderstanding this principle that make nonsense of it. But the first principle all the while exercises its unobtrusive control, for it drives the mind on toward judgment, never permitting it to settle into inconsistent muddle. It directs that good is to be done and pursued, and it allows no alternative within the field of action. 1-2, q. Only after practical reason thinks does the object of its thought begin to be a reality. In accordance with this inclination, those things relating to an inclination of this sort fall under natural law. Practical reason uses first principles (e.g., "Good is to be done and pursued, and bad avoided") aimed at the human good in the deliberation over the acts. In the first paragraph Aquinas restates the analogy between precepts of natural law and first principles of theoretical reason. As Suarez sees it, the inclinations are not principles in accordance with which reason forms the principles of natural law; they are only the matter with which the natural law is concerned. [11] In issuing this basic prescription, reason assumes its practical function; and by this assumption reason gains a point of view for dealing with experience, a point of view that leads all its further acts in the same line to be preceptive rather than merely speculative. Man discovers this imperative in his conscience; it is like an inscription written there by the hand of God. [79] S.T. That the basic precepts of practical reason lead to the natural acts of the will is clear: shows that there is no natural determinate last end for man. But in reason itself there is a basic principle, and the first principle of practical reason is the ultimate end. To the third argument, that law belongs to reason and that reason is one, Aquinas responds that reason indeed is one in itself, and yet that natural law contains many precepts because reason directs everything which concerns man, who is complex. [84] Yet mans ability to choose the ultimate concrete end for which he shall act does not arise from any absurdity in human nature and its situation. In the treatise on the Old Law, for example, Aquinas takes up the question whether this law contains only a single precept. In the next article, Aquinas adds another element to his definition by asking whether law always is ordained to the common good. 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